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/A. The Mission
From 24 March to 6 April a mission, composed of two members of INTERTECT 
(a disaster operations specialist/planner and a nutritionist/puhlic health 
specialist) and one staff member of UNHCR, Visited Somalia to review the 
emergency operations.
The Somalia case study is part of a comprehensive study on emergency 
preparedness and response capabilities of UNHCR as outlined in PCS/4II of 
26 July 1979 and the terms of reference in PCS/55I dated 23 November 1979*
The present brief report on feeding and nutrition is excerpted from the 
larger study.
B. Itinerary
The itinerary was planned so that the mission could visit representative 
refugee settlements in all areas. Visits were arranged to approximately 
half of all the refugee camps now open. The camps visited were in three of 
the four regions where concentrations of refugees reside; it was felt that 
a representative sample of the range of.problems was viewed by the mission.
Specifically, the mission visited the following carnps (in chronological 
order):
1. Shabelli region: Corioli One
Corioli Two
Corioli Three
2. Hargeisa region: Saba*ad
Dam
Agabar
3. Gedo region: Halba One
Halba Two
Ali Matin
A1 Waq (a transit camp).
C. Methodology /
In each camp the team divided to conduct individual investigations into 
each of the various assigned topics, generally following a checklist developed 
for this mission. For the purposes of the study of feeding and nutrition, the 
camp administrator and chief medical officer were interviewed in each camp. 
Food stores and medical facilities were visited in every case and individual 
households were surveyed at random to examine the extent of food supplies on 
hand and the general nutritional status of the population, especially the 
young children. Detailled observations were recorded by the team members.
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The review included an examination of the logistical and procurement 
records relating to the feeding programmes, conversations with the NRO 
regional coordinators in each region visitad, discussions with the USAID 
and U.S. Embassy personnel involved in the relief operation, and discussions 
with the UNHCR Branch and Field Officers in charge of logistics and 
feeding programme coordination.
D. Feeding and nutrition
l.\ Basic food rations - In the majority of the camps visited, it was 
observed ,;that basic food rations were partially or completely exhausted.
Food stores'were completely empty at Agabar, Halba I and Halba II camps, 
but for the last few sacks of food left over from previous distributions.
In fact, in the Halba camps, food destined for the supplementary feeding 
programs was observed being diverted for basic ration distribution, in order 
to partially offset the critical situation which had developed. In most 
other camps, supplies on hand in the storerooms were low in relation to the 
size of the camp populations for which they were intended. In several cases, 
especially in the Hargeisa Region, further food distributions had been effect­
ively suspended by the camp officials since the amounts of some individual 
food items available per family from the supplies on hand fell under the 
daily basic ration set by the National Refuge Office.
It would a.ppear that the GOS has almost' completely exhausted its food 
reserves so that the NRO central storerooms are all but empty. Attempts by 
the UNHCR/Somalia staff person in charge of logistics and.the members of the 
INTERTECT team to visit the NRO stores have not been successful.
It is evident that although the relief operation has been able to "muddle 
through" up until the present time, the current situation appears too critical 
for this to continue without serious ramifications. Any disruption of 
scheduled deliveries to Somalia or from the regional stores to the camps 
themselves (for reasons such as impassability of roads during the forth­
coming rainy season, shortages of fuel, or problems of maintenance or repair 
of trucks), or a sudden influx of new refugees due to increased military 
action or drought in the region, could cause the marginal situation to 
become totally unmanageable.
It is important to note that the basic food rations destined for the 
refugees are not only lacking in quantity at the present time, but if 
delivered according to NRO guidelines would be also lacking in quality.
Two or more different rations are planned; Table 1 illustrates two ration 
lists currently in use.
Tables 2 and 3 give details of the nutrient composition of the two 
food rations and the percentage adequation of the recommended daily allow­
ances (RDA) for different subgroups of the population, respectively.
From these data, the following conclusions can be drawn with regard to 
the quantity and quality of the average basic food ration, with respect to 
the different subgroups of the refugee population.
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Table 1: Basic food ration lists in use in Shabelli and Harareisa
Regions, as set by the National Refugee Office of the Government 
* ' ' of Somalia, 1980.
Region •* W  ’ SHABELLI KARGEISA
Food item Dry weight ration/person/day (g.)
POLISHED RICE 75 1 0 0
WHOLE MAIZE (or SORGHUM) 0LTNC\J 2 0 0
FORTIFIED DRIED SKIMMED MILK (DSM) 50 50
WHITE SUGAR 4 0 60
EDIBLE OIL 4 0 60
BEEF (weekly ration) 2 5 0 -
TEA 3 -
WHEAT FLOUR - 60
Table 2: Nutrient composition of basic food rations in use in Shabelli
and Hargeisa Regions, as set by the National Refugee Office of 
the Government of Somalia, 1980.*
Region SHABELLI HARGEISA AVERAGE
Nutrient
Calories 1,949 2,249 2,099
Protein (g.) 55*4 51.6 53.5
Vitamin A (i.U.) 2,875 2,800 2,838
Vitamin B: Niacin (mg.) 8.4 6.8 7.6
Thiamine (mg.) 1.20 1.17 1.19
Riboflavin (mg.) 1.23 1—1H•1—< 1.17
Vitamin C (mg.) 8.5 8.5 8.5
Iron (mg.) 8.7 8.0 8.4
Calcium (mg.) 66 9 671 670
*Source: Platt, 1962. r
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Table 3: Percentage adequation of the recommended daily allowances for
population subgroups of average basic food rations in use in 
* Shabelli and Hargeisa Regions, 1980.*
Nutrient Calories Protein Vit.A
----
Niacin Thiamine Ribo. Vit.C Iron Calcium
Subgroup Percentage adequation: 100% means fully adequate.
Children 1-3 yrs. 154 334 341 84 238 146 43 84 134
7-9 yrs. 96 214 213 52 132 90 43 84 . 134
Male 13-15 yrs. 72 145 117 40 99 69 28 47 96
Female 13-15 yrs. 84 173 117 46 119 78 35 35 96
Adult male 70 145 113 38 99 65 28 93 134
Adult female 95 184 113 52 132 90 28 30 134
Pregnant female 82 141 113 45 119 78 17 30 56
Lactating female 76 116 71 42 108 69 17 30 56
^Source: Passmore, et.al., 1974*
a. Taken on an individual basis, the food quantity of the ration, i.e. its 
caloric content, is adequate for young children but inadequate for teenagers, 
adult males and pregnant and lactating females. However, by distributing 
food by family, averaging takes care of some of these difficulties. The 
deficiency of calories for pregnant and lactating females is normally resolved 
through supplementary feeding programmes, yet these are only operated in a 
few camps.
b. As is common in emergency food rations, excessive emphasis has been 
placed upon the delivery of protein in the diet. However, nearly half the 
protein is derived from maize, and nearly half from DSM. Should either of 
these food sources be removed from the ration due to shortages, the RDA would 
not be met for two of the vulnerable groups, the pregnant and lactating females.
c. The vitamin A content of the ration is adequate for all age groups and 
sexes, except lactating women. The vitamin A is almost entirely supplied by 
DSM, so that should this food item become scarce, the ration would become 
virtually free of vitamin A. ' Thus the importance of supplementary feeding 
programmes is again highlighted.
d. The basic ration is not adequate in niacin (a member of the vitamin B 
group), for all age groups and sexes, due to dietary reliance on maize or 
sorghum. Deficiency over an extended period will lead to the appearance of 
pellagra in the population.
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e. Thiamine (vitamin B^) and Riboflavin (vitamin B^) are more adequately 
supplied in the basic ration. However, the vast majority of the thiamine 
(as is*the-niacin) is delivered by the maize component of the ration, and
if this food'item becomes scarce, symptoms w<if beriberi would become widespread 
amongst campr populations.
f. The vitamin C content of the basic food rations is wholly inadequate, 
and is supplied in its entirety from DSM. Fresh fruit and vegetables are 
not supplied in the basic ration nor in the existing supplementary feeding 
programmes.
g. The iron content of the basic camp rations is inadequate, especially 
for the female population whose needs are always greater than those of the 
male population. Supplementary feeding programs could resolve this deficiency 
for pregnant and lactating women, but the remainder of the female population 
of the camps can be expected to become severely anemic if this dietary regime 
is maintained over long periods.
h. The adequacy of calcium in the basic ration is satisfactory for ail 
groups except pregnant and lactating women, due to the dietary contribution
of DSM. Supplementary feeding programs therefore are needed to prevent growth 
deficiencies in infants and young children.
In conclusion, the basic ration utilized by the FRO at the present time 
is seriously deficient in both quantity and quality. There exists an urgent 
need to revise the basic ration in order to improve the nutritional short­
comings.
It is important to note that the serious quantity and quality deficiencies 
in the refugee diet most adversely affect the vulnerable groups: children
and pregnant and lactating women. In the particular case of Somalia, the 
majority of the camp population happens to be women and children, so that 
the deficiencies described actually affect the majority of the people 
currently living in the refugee camps.
Factors contributing to the problem - The following factors were 
identified as contributing to the problems in basic food rations.
a. In general, food shipments to Somalia have not kept pace with needs.
The GOS has all but exhausted its stocks of food staples (sorghum is no 
longer available within the country), and the World Food Program (WFP) 
supplies have not been sufficient to meet the food shortfall. In some cases 
donors have not delivered according to their pledges. It has been argued 
that the refugee population has increased suddenly. The INTERTECT team would
to
argue, however, -that the refugee population has teen growing at a steady 
rate over the last 12 months, and that even if the predictions of total camp 
population.were incorrect even hy as much as 10$, this is no explanation for 
the extreme shortages observed. The missidn^feels that inadequate monitoring 
and forecasting of needs is the major contributing factor to the shortage.
b. The shortage of heavy trucks and of fuel already cited are also con­
tributing factors but do not explain the shortages on hand.
c. As mentioned earlier, the distribution system does not permit advance 
planning. Although the records permit storekeepers to account for movements ' 
in and out of the stores, there is little scope for advance prediction of 
when further deliveries will be required, either at the regional level or
in the ca.mps.
d. The absence of adequate supplementary feeding programmes means that 
there is no mechanism by which inequities in the distribution of basic rations 
can be smoothed out. The vulnerable groups are therefore not satisfactorily 
protected against nutritional deficiencies.
e. The time period between basic ration distributions in the ca.rn.ps is 
often as great as 30 days. There is extensive experience in other refugee 
situations (see UNHCR, I9S0) that strongly suggests that such long periods 
between distributions are unadvisable. Under such circumstances an "accordion 
effect" often develops, in which the food is used liberally by the family 
when it is first supplied, leading to shortages later in the month. The 
effect becomes more and more exaggerated each month since the family becomes 
progressively more desperate by the time each distribution becomes due.
The ideal time period between distributions is 7 to 10 days.
f. In certain cases, unintentional inequities in the distribution of 
basic food rations to families were observed in the camps, caused by poor 
record keeping and the inadequate family registration. It is essential that 
some kind of card registration mechanism be adopted for all the camps in order 
not only to keep track of food distributions but also to aid in the collection 
of statistics and the maintenance of health and nutritional surveillance data.
g. Food losses were observed in certain camp storerooms, due to accidental 
spillage, and to deficiencies in the food storage system. Some edible oil 
was lost when the cans in which it was transported were smashed; some wheat 
flour was observed to have been transported in simple burlap sacks which
were water damaged at some point in their journey. Losses also occurred in 
certain storerooms due to attack by vermin and birds, and some sacks were 
damaged by being placed directly on the ground.
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Interventions for the solution of problems relating to basic food 
rations - A wide variety of interventions will "be required to resolve the 
problems.surrounding the delivery of adequate "basic food rations to the
' " V* ■»refugee, camp'populations. The following me^ures cover the actions that are 
necessary:
a. A comprehensive system of surveillance should "be instituted throughout 
the NRO operation to monitor food needs throughout the distribution hierarchy: 
at the camps, in the regional storerooms, and in Somalia as a whole. A 
system is required that permits the continuous monitoring of stocks in hand 
in combination with the advance ordering of supplies "before they "become 
critically•low at all levels.
b. Superior advance supply planning and population prediction by WFP in 
collaboration with the donor countries is essential in order to maintain 
adequate food supplies in the country. It would seem imperative that nego­
tiations be initiated immediately to resolve the immediate food quantity crisis, 
followed by tighter control over the on-going food supply situation through 
more comprehensive planning.
c. At the refugee camp level, a family registration system should be 
instituted, through which local distributions can be monitored and controlled, 
and inequities removed from the system. Adequate systems tested through 
practical experience in the field are described in the literature (Chapter 4» 
de Ville de Goyet, et.al., 1978; Manual No. 10, UNHCR, I98O).
d. More trucks will be required for transportation throughout the dis­
tribution hierarchy, and the storage of independent supplies of fuel and 
materials for maintenance and repair of the trucks would free the transporta­
tion system of dependence of the vagaries of the local market.
e. The rationalization of the nutritional composition of the refugee 
diet by a public health nutritionist should be undertaken promptly in order 
to resolve deficiencies of food quality.
f. Adequate supplementary feeding programmes should be instituted in 
the camps in order to smooth out inequities in the individual nutritional 
requirements between regular and vulnerable groups in the camp population 
(see Section II D 2 following).
g. Food storage facilities and practices should be upgraded in order to 
minimize food losses. Adequate systems have been described in the litera­
ture (see Chapter 8, de Ville de Goyet, et.al., 1978).
Lessons lea.rned and implications for emergency preparedness - Normal roles 
for HCR in basic rations are:
- To assist the host government in assessing needs;
- To formulate appeals for food;
- To coordinate donations;
- To provide logistics support when foocf ^arrives.
Of these, KCR has no standardized system for needs assessment, especially 
in formulating calorie and nutrient content requirements, nor are staff mem­
bers cognizant of the basic issues in nutrition; the formulation of appeals 
is imprecise due to the lack of knowledge about local nutritional and feed­
ing habits; the ability to coordinate donations is limited by lack of moni­
toring capability; and logistics support is limited to purchasing vehicles.
An additional role which UNHCR should play is advicing the Government 
on record keeping and monitoring of food supplies but this cannot be accom­
plished at present due to a lack of experienced or trained personnel and 
model systems.
If HCR is to be effective in each of these roles, it must take appro­
priate action to rectify these deficiencies, • While many of these tasks can 
be delegated to WFP or other implementing agencies, HCR must retain the 
capability of making credible evaluations of the contractors1 performance,
2, Supplementa.ry feeding programs - In the majority of the camps visited 
by the Mission, supplementary feeding programs were either deficient or 
non-existent.
The NRO medical officer for the Corioli camps informed the Mission that 
supplementary foods 'were being distributed in the form of a dry ration once 
every two weeks to approximately 10$ of the camp population. However, the 
figure of 10$ of the camp had apparently been arbitrarily set, whereas the 
proportion of persons falling into the generally accepted classification of 
vulnerable groups clearly exceeded that figure. The medical officer estimated 
that vulnerable groups comprised a minimum of 5^ 7° of "the camp populations 
at Corioli I, II and III. It was not possible to verify when the last 
supplementary food distribution had taken place.
Supplementary feeding was non-existent at Saba1ad and Dam camps, in 
Hargeisa region. A programme has been organized along conventional lines,
i.e. the distribution of a cooked ration several times per day directly 
to vulnerable groups, at Agabar camp under the supervision of medical 
personnel working with the Catholic Institute for International Relations 
(CIIR). However, feeding had been suspended since all food supplies were
exhausted
In the Gedo region, the Mission observed a supplementary feeding 
activity (though not a complete programme) only at Halha II camp, under 
the supervision of the medical personnel working with Medicins sans 
Frontieres .(MSP). The Oxfam Feeding Kit wa£'being utilized by the team.
No other supplementary feeding programs were observed.
The supplementary foods used differed. Table 4 illustrates 2 rations 
currently used and their nutritional composition.
Table 4: Supplementary food ration lists with their respective nutrient
compositions in use in Corioli and Halba camps. Somalia, 1980.*
Region SHAEELLI GEDO
Camp Corioli Halba
Form of ration Dry ration Cooked ration
Frequency Bulk distribution 
every 15 days
Twice per day
Food item Dry weight ration/p erson/day (g.)
FORTIFIED DRIED SKIMMED 
MILK (DSM) 40 80
CORN-SOYA-MILK (CSM) 80 -
WHITE SUCAR 20 -
EDIBLE OIL 15 -
Nutrient
Calories 662 286
Protein (g.) 30.4 28.8
Vitamin A (i.U.) 3360 4000
Vitamin B: Niacin (mg.) 6.8 0.9
Thiamine (mg.) 0.82 0.36
Riboflavin (mg.) 1.25 1.22
Vitamin C (mg.) 38.8 13.6
Iron (mg.) 14.8 0.8
Calcium (mg.) 1304 1008
*Source: Platt, 1962.
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From the above data, the following broad conclusions may be drawn.
a. Where supplementary feeding programmes are conducted, there is a 
great disparity between the supplementation delivered. Dry rations are being 
distributed bjr the URO, whereas the more appropriate cooked ration is being 
supplied only by those voluntary agencies with the facilities, equipment
and expertise to carry out the operation on a regular basis.
b. The IIRO ration list is nutritionally better balanced due to the 
utilization of a variety of foodstuffs, than the voluntary a.genciesT regime 
using DSM alone. Milk alone does not constitute a supplementary feeding 
programme. For the purposes of supplementary feeding, a food combination 
supplying more calories, niacin and iron is required.
Factors contributim- to the problem - The following factors contribute 
to the problems surrounding supplementary feeding.
a. There would appear to be a poor understanding on the part of the 
GOS and UNHCR as to the function of supplementary feeding for vulnerable 
groups. This lack of understanding has led to the lack of emphasis on 
the establishment of such feeding programmes. The NRO has not clearly 
differentiated the terms "supplementary feeding” (designed to strengthen 
the diets of vulnerable groups), "intensive feeding" (designed to recuperate 
seriously malnourished individuals) and "therapeutic feeding" (a term not 
currently used in public health work).
b. There is a lack of adequate personnel with refugee camp experience 
with which to mount an appropriate supplementary feeding programme for the 
camps. This is surprising given that personnel experienced in the feeding 
operations in the camps set up in Somalia to deal with the 1974-75 drought 
should still be found within the national population. Conditions in the 
present refugee camps are so similar that for all practical purposes the 
same personnel could be employed to undertake the same work as was carried 
out with reasonable competence in the earlier camps (see Abbas, 197S).
c. The same factors that have resulted in general shortages of basic 
rations (see Section II D l) influence the supply of supplementary foods.
Interventions for the solution of problems relating to supplementary 
feeding - The following actions should be taken to establish and/or improve 
supplementary feeding programmes (interventions concerned with the delivery 
of basic food rations also apply):
a. One or more food agencies with extensive experience in programmes of 
supplementary feeding should be contracted to undertake such programmes 
under the supervision and coordination of UMHCR. Agencies with such experi­
ence which should be contacted include:
n- Concern, Eire;
- Bread for the World, West Germany;
- Care, U.S.A.;
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- Cath.olic Relief Services, U.S.A.;
- Church World Service, U.S.A.
Adequate systems tested through practical experience in the field are 
described in the literature (Chapter 4» de Ville de Goyet, 1978? Manual 
No. 11, UNHCR, 1980; Chapter 5, PAG, 1977).
b. The involvement of one or more Somali nationals with experience in 
feeding from the 1974-75 relief camps should be encouraged. In this way, 
the supplementary feeding programme can be tailored to fit in well with 
local norms and customs.
c. In all cases the supplementary feeding programme should be implemented 
in close collaboration with established programmes of preventive health in 
the camps (see Section II E 2 in the present■report), and in coordination 
with improved NRO food distribution systems.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Supplementary 
feeding progra.mmes are an activity that is always required in a refugee camp 
environment. It serves to protect the vulnerable groups but also is an 
ideal programme for delivery of other services such as preventive health and 
medical programmes, health surveillance activities, public health education, 
and monitoring of the basic ration distribution. Normally HCR will contract 
a voluntary agency or the host government to provide this service. As 
important as these programme are, HCR personnel must be conversant with the 
basic issues involved in setting up and running such a programme. In order 
to be properly prepared for selecting the appropriate agency and seeing that 
adequate pro,grammes are established, HCR should take the following steps:
a. Provide the Branch Office with literature on the establishment and 
operation of these pro,grammes. Suitable references for non-medical and 
-nutrition personnel are available.
b. Establish close linkages with agencies that are recognized specialists 
in this type of programme and contract them at early stages of the emergency 
to provide advice on setting up the programmes.
c. Develop model standards which can be used or adapted to guide agencies 
in setting up programmes. (The standards developed in Thailand (UNHCR, I98O) 
provide a current example.)
d. Establish a closer link to WFP and WHO emergency operations personnel 
who are specifically concerned with this activity.
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e. Develop a mechanism whereby a nutritionist/feeding programme 
specialist can be seconded quickly to the Branch Office to assist in deter­
mining the- scope of the required programme. (At present this is left to 
WFP, but often they do not assign an experienced specialist. Thus HGR 
should have ■'the capability to provide this expertise if WFP cannot.)
In order to serve as a back-up feeding system capable of smoothing out 
temporary shortages and insuring that the vulnerable groups will always have 
adequate food, the supplementary feeding programme should receive separate 
stocks of food. If possible, independent supplies should be established.
The best way this con be effectively accomplished is to utilize the "food 
agencies"•that have their own sources of supply and their own logistics.
HCR should develop standing agreements with these groups to provide stand-by 
services in emergencies.
3. Intensive feeding programmes - Intensive feeding programmes were not 
operating in any of the refugee camps visited by the Mission. In particular 
no such program had been established at the A1 Waq transit camp in Gedo 
Region, and it is doubtful that there exists such a programme at either of 
the other 2 transit camps (one in Hiran, one in Hargeisa) in the country.
The following reasons for the absence of intensive feeding programmes 
were identified.
a. There is no understanding of the function of intensive feeding as 
part of a refugee relief operation. In particular the special importance 
of transit (reception) camps as the appropriate location for intensive 
feeding, medical examination and immunization of incoming refugee arrivals 
before transfer to established camps is not appreciated.
b. Similarly, a lack of adequate, trained personnel exists for the imple 
mentation of an appropriate intensive feeding pro,gram in the transit camps. 
Due to the delicate and time-consuming nature of the work involved, it is 
essential that early emphasis be placed on the establishment of personnel 
selection and training schemes so that a.dequate numbers of workers are 
available to initiate these programmes as soon as possible.
c. The procurement and logistical factors that have resulted in general 
shortages of basic rations and supplementary foods apply to intensive 
feeding operations.
Interventions for the solution of problems relating to Intensive 
feeding - The measures for the establishment of intensive feeding programs
in the transit camps are:
a. A food agency with extensive experience in programs of intensive
feeding should be contracted to undertake such programs in the transit camps
under the supervision and coordination of UNHCR. An agency with suitable
field experience is Catholic Relief Services, U.S.A. Adequate delivery ■* v*-*
systems tested through practical experience in the field are described in 
the literature (Chapter 5» d.<3 Ville de Goyet, 1978; Manual No. 13, UNHCR, 
1980; Chapter 6, PAG, 1977)• (Note: the term "therapeutic feeding"
appears in the older literature in place of the more modern term "intensive 
feeding".)
b. Under no circumstances should intensive feeding be instituted on a 
regular basis in the standard refugee camps, but only in transit (reception) 
camps with the objective of recuperating individuals suffering from serious 
malnutrition. Therefore the logistical planning and implementation necessary 
to supply food, equipment and personnel for intensive feeding need only be 
directed at 3 locations.
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - HCR Branch 
Offices can be made more conversant with this type of programme by provision 
of the available, non-technical literature as well as a guide to the basic 
issues. Information regarding all types of feeding programmes and the 
conditions when they are required should be a part of UNHCR staff training.
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